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VALUATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
Theory of Valuation of Public Utility for Rate-Making Purposes Announced in Smyth vs.
Ames in 1897-Effect of Changing Economic Conditions on Views of Interested
Parties-Consistent Adherence of United States Supreme Court to Announced
Principle of Valuation-The O'Fallon Decision Simply Reaffirms This
and Declares No New Law
By ALFRED EVENS
Professor of Law of the University of Indiana
T HE O'Fallon decision is now more than twelvemonths old. Perhaps the exuberance of the apos-tles of "reproduction" cost and the depression of
the devotees of "prudent investment" cost have both
sufficiently adjusted themselves to normal to now
appreciate that neither won a victory in the O'Fallon
decision."
The O'Fallon decision declares no new law. Yet
it is one of great importance and far-reaching in its
consequences.
In 1897, in the oft quoted decision of Smyth v.
Ames,2 the Supreme Court announced the theory of
valuation of a railroad or a public utility for rate mak-
ing purposes required by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution. The public interest in that
case was almost as keen as in the O'Fallon case. In
the midst of the panic and general economic depression
of the last decade of last century the State of Nebraska
sought relief by passing a law fixing maximum freight
rates. The stockholders of.various railroads affected
filed suits questioning the constitutionality of the act.
It was the contention of the plaintiffs that this act
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The determination of this question in-
volved as a consideration of prime importance the
adoption of a correct theory for ascertaining the values
of the railroads involved for rate making purposes.
The economic depression and distress at that time
(the act was passed in 1893) was very great. Many
public spirited men were deeply interested in the con-
troversy. William Jennings Bryan was an attorney
for the defense in the case and with characteristic vigor
presented the "people's" cause against the railroads.
The several suits were consolidated. The parties pre-
sented their views on the correct theory of valuation
with great earnestness and with some spleen. The Su-
preme Court, after mature consideration, announced
the principle governing the valuation of a railroad or a
public utility property for rate making purposes which
has since been adhered to by it and which was re-
affirmed in the O'Fallon decision.
It is interesting to note in the various causes in-
volving ascertainment of value how the positions of
parties have changed with changing economic condi-
tions. In Smyth v. Ames, Mr. Bryan, on behalf of
the public, insisted, with as much earnestness as the
utility lawyer of the last decade, on the cost of repro-
duction as the infallible rule for ascertaining value.
He argued "that the present value of the roads, as
measured by the cost of reproduction, is the basis upon
which profit should be computed. . . The ordinary
1. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. et al v. United States et al, 279
U. S. 461, 49 S. Ct 384.
2. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 466.
business man cannot avail himself of watered stock or
fictitious capitalization, nor can he protect himselffrom falling prices. (Our italics.) If his property
rises in value, he profits thereby; so do the owners
of a railroad under similar conditions. If his prop-
erty falls in value, he loses thereby; so must the owners
of a railroad under similar conditions, unless it can
be shown that railroad property deserves more pro-
tection than other forms of property."
On the other hand the stockholders of the rail-
roads contended "that a railroad company is entitled
to exact such charges for transportation as will enable
it, at all times, not only to pay operating expenses, but
also to meet the interest regularly accruing upon all its
outstanding obligations, and justify a dividend upon
all its stock."4  In other words, the stockholders con-
tended for a valuation for rate making purposes equal
to their outstanding stock and interest bearing obliga-
tions upon the assumption that this sum fairly repre-
sents the cost of the property. To support this view
great importance was placed on original cost of con-
struction of the railroads at the high prices following
the Civil War.
The court held that the constitutional guarantee
to the railroad was a fair return on "the fair value of
the property being used by it for the convenience of
the public."- The court further. pointed out that a
"fair value" could not be ascertained by either the
formula of cost of reproduction alone or by the ascer-
tainment of the sum total of the outstanding stocks
and bonds of the railroads. The court recognized cost
of reproduction, the amount of outstanding stocks and
bonds, and the original cost as competent evidence as
to value but held that other competent evidence bear-
ing on value must likewise be considered. The court
further held that in arriving at fair value not only all
relevant evidence should be considered but that each
factor should be given such weight, as under the cir-
cumstances of the cause under investigation, it was
entitled to receive.
The court enumerated various types of evidence
that should be given consideration in ascertaining value,
namely: (1) original cost of construction, (2)
amount expended in permanent improvements, (3)
amount and market value of bonds and stock, (4)
present as compared with original cost of construc-
tion, (5) probable earning capacity of the property
under the rate in question, and (6) the sum required
to meet operating expenses. The court also points out
that the above list of matters to be given consideration
is not intended as all inclusive and is not intended to
3. 169 U. S. 466, p. 489-90.
4. 169 U. S. 466, p. 543.
5. 169 U. S. 466, p. 546.
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exclude other relevant evidence as to value. The court
holds that each matter above enumerated is to be given
such consideration and weight as may be "just and
right" under the circumstances of each case.
The court does not attempt to circumscribe the
honest judgment of the trying tribunal by any hard
and fast formula telling how much weight must be
given to any particular character of evidence. All
competent evidence must be received and all evidence
must be given such weight as under the circumstances
of the case under investigation is "just and right."
For thirty-two years the Supreme Court has con-
sistently, we submit, adhered to the principle of valua-
tion declared in Smyth v. Ames. It has cited this case
with approval no less than thirty times in a period of
thirty years. In the O'Fallon decision it has reaffirmed
this principle.
For several years following Smyth v Ames, at-
torneys for the public continued, it seems, to press
reproduction costs as the prime factor in valuation
and the utilities continued to insist primarily upon
original cost and the amount of outstanding bonds
and stock.' The Supreme Court has consistently
pointed out that, while these matters were proper evi-
dence, each to be given such consideration as was fair
to both the utility and the public under all the facts
and circumstances developed in the case under investi-
gation, yet the question for determination was the fair
value of the property used for the public at the time
under investigation, not its cost at some time in the past.
So long as prices were depressed and the cost of
reproduction remained less than the original cost or
the outstanding amount of bonds and stock, the repre-
sentatives of the public continued to urge cost of re-
production as the prime factor in valuation, and the
representatives of utilities and railroads opposed this
contention, insisting upon original cost or the amount
of outstanding bonds and stock as the controlling
factor.
As the country recovered from the economic de-
pression of the last decade of the nineteenth century,
the excess of prices at the time of construction over
the prevailing construction prices for current work
disappeared and in some cases there was a shifting of
the balance on the opposite side. Naturally, the utilities
and railroads became less bitter in their opposition to
reproduction costs as a dominant factor in valuation.
They were willing to concede to the public representa-
tives a point which gave to these officials the satisfac-
tion of victory, and which cost the companies nothing.
There followed a period in which prices were substan-
tially normal. There was not the great disparity be-
tween prices 'at the time of construction and at the
time of the valuation. Consequently there was not
the same motive of self-interest to arouse the bitter
controversy present in Smyth v. Ames.
Furthermore, records of original costs were defec-
tive and in many cases the ascertainment of original
construction costs was an impossibility. The result
was a practical one rather than a legal one, namely, for
many years the cost of reproduction was largely re-
sorted to by commissions (the utilities acquiescing
6. 169 U. S. 466, p. 547.
7. San Diego L. & T. Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 19
S. Ct. 804; San Diego L. & T. Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 23 S.
Ct. 571; Stanislaus Co. v. San Joaquin etc. Co., 192 U. S. 201, 24
S. Ct. 241.
therein) as a means of arriving at value for rate mak-
ing purposes.
So long as the economic development of the coun-
try proceeded along normal lines, self-interest, the
parent of economic controversies, found no substantial
advantage in advocating either original cost or repro-
duction cost as a dominating factor in valuation. The
interest of the contending parties was, therefore,
diverted for the time being from the main controversy
between original cost and reproduction cost. Both
exercised their ingenuity in attempting to inject or
exclude the consideration of some particular factor or
factors in determining value in the particular case
under investigation.
After the decision in Stanislaus Co. v. San
Joaquin,8 decided in 1904, the utilities seemed not to
have seriously urged in the Supreme Court original
cost as the dominant factor in valuation. From time
to time in particular cases the amount of outstanding
stocks and bonds seems to have been rather faintly
urged, but the main controversies largely centered
around collateral questions which were equally applica-
ble under the reproduction theory or the original cost
theory.
For a time valuation cases were tried largely on
minor issues. Such questions as the following occu-
pied the attention of the court: (1) may a percentage
reduction made by the utility for prompt payment of
bills be subtracted from the estimated income to the
end that the rate may thereby be increased;' (2) ques-
tions as to depreciation;w (3) may good will be cap-
italized;"x (4) may franchises be capitalized;12 (5)
may going concern value be considered in fixing value
for rate making purposes;"1 (6) may past losses be
capitalized;" (7) to what extent may income taxes
be deducted from the gross earnings to arrive at net
earnings for use in rate making?1a
The Minnesota Rate Cases," decided in 1913, it
is true, did present a rather lively scrimmage between
the theory of original cost and reproduction cost, but
the scrimmage was on a limited scale, being largely
confined to the valuation of naked land. The land
values of the railroads in question and particularly
their. terminal lands in the large cities of Minneapolis,
St. Paul and Duluth had enormously increased in value.
The Attorney General of Minnesota advanced the
argument that the basis upon which rates should be
fixed "is limited to the investments of the corpora-
tion." 17
On the other hand, the railroads sought to apply
the reproduction idea to naked land values and in doing
so asked for (1) allowances for so-called "railway
value" over and above the value of similar land in the
vicinity, (2) allowances for "conjectural cost of acqui-
sition and consequential damages," (3) allowance for
engineering, superintendence, legal expenses, contin-
8. Stanislaus Co. v. San Joaquin etc. Co., Supra.
9. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1; 29 S. Ct.
148; Cedar Rapids etc. Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 32 S.
Ct. 389.
10. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729, 48
L. R. A. (n.s.) 1151; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., Supra.
11. Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, 29 S. Ct. 192,
48 L. R. A. (n.s.) 1134; Des Moines Gas Co. v. City, 238 U. S. 153,
35 S. Ct. 811.
12. Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas. Co., Supra; Cedar Rapids Gas-
light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, Supra; Des Moines Gas Co., v. City, Supra.
13. Des Moines Gas Co. v. City, Supra.
14. Galveston E. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S.388, 42 S. Ct. 351.
15. Galveston E. Co. v. Galveston, Supra.
A. (n.s.) 1151, Am. Cas. 1916A 18.
16. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729, 48 L. R.
17. 48 L. R. A. (n.s.) 1151, p. 1153.
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gencies and interest during construction on land
values."
The court rejected these contentions. It was said,
"the property is held in private ownership, and it is
that property, and not the original cost of it, of which
the owner may not be deprived without due process
of law." 9 But the court also said, "The company
would certainly have no ground of complaint if it were
allowed a value for these lands equal to the fair aver-
age market value of similar land in the vicinity, with-
out additions by the use of multipliers, or otherwise, to
cover hypothetical outlays." 20
While the whole theory of valuation is restated
by the court in this opinion, it will be observed that the
occasion of the controversy was the greatly enhanced
land value due to a rapid growth of the three cities
in which these railroads had their principal terminals,
rather than a general economic inflation or depression.
The first decade of the present century witnessed
the creation of public service commissions in a large
number of states and a resulting increase in the effort
of the public authorities to regulate rates charged by
railroads and public utilities. Congress in 1913 passed
the Railway Valuation Act of March 1, 1913,21 requir-
ing the Interstate Commerce Commission to value the
railroads of the country.
Such legislation in itself was sufficient to arouse
the interest of students of law and economics in the
subject of valuation of such properties for rate mak-
ing purposes. But the rapid increase in price levels
following the outbreak of the world war brought about
an economic situation where acute controversies be-
tween the representatives of the public and those of
the utilities and railroads was inevitable. We were
now in another economic upheaval. The difference
between the present controversy and the one involved
in Smyth v. Ames was that reproduction costs were
now abnormally high instead of abnormally low. It is,
therefore, no great surprise to the discriminating stu-
dent of economic history that self-interest now caused
the contending forces to take opposite sides of the
controversy from those taken in the industrial depres-
sion of the last decade of the 19th century.
Since original cost as the sole measure of value
had, in response to the arguments of the representatives
of the public, been repudiated so often and in such cer-
tain terms by the Supreme Court,22 the representatives
of the public now found new names for original cost,
namely "historical cost" or "prudent investment cost."
Under these new names they eliminated some of the
considerations possible under original cost which the
Supreme Court had pointed out as weaknesses of that
theory as the sole measure of value, such as dishonest
or wasteful expenditures. The fact, however, remains
that "historical cost" or "prudent investment cost,"
however camouflaged, is original cost, and many of
their advocate s of the last ten years have, we submit,
become devotees because prices of original construc-
tion were materially lower than the prices of repro-
duction at the time of the inquiry. In other words,
the historical facts indicate that either consciously or
unconsciously the representatives of the public con-
ceive it to be their duty to obtain the service in ques-
18. 48 L. R. A. (n.s.) 1151, pp. 1189-90.
19. 230 U. S. 352, p. 454.
20. 230 U. S. 352, p. 455.
21. 37 Stat at Large 701, C. 92.
22. Smyth v. Ames, Supra; San Diego L. & T. Co. v. National
City, Supra; San Diego L. & T. Co. v. jasper, Supra; Stanislaus v.
San Joaquin etc. Co. Supra.
tion for the public at as low a rate as possible. To
do this requires a low valuation. The theory of valua-
tion advocated by them has been, whether in times of
depression or inflation, merely a means to this end.
This process of conversion of the representatives
of the public from ardent reproduction cost advocates
to ardent prudent investment advocates was, of course,
a gradual process corresponding fairly closely to the
mounting construction prices which followed the in-
dustrial depression of the 90's and which preceded the
world war. As early as Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas
Co., decided in 1909, Mr. Alton B. Parker, who acted
as an attorney for New York City, foresaw the shift-
ing of interests and on behalf of the public advanced
the prudent investment theory.23
On the records of the Supreme Court, Mr. Bryan,
the super-champion of the people for a quarter of a
century, was the father of the reproduction cost theory
as the measure of value for rate making purposes.
Mr. Parker, a conservative lawyer, was one of the
first advocates of, if not the father of, the prudent in-
vestment theory. May not this fact furnish food for
thought to those, on both sides of the controversy,
who are now finding fault with the Supreme Court's
decisions on valuation?
With equal disregard for theoretical consistency
in their views on valuation, the representatives of the
utlities and railroads conceived it to be their main prom-
lem to secure as high rates for the service of their com-
panies as the traffic would bear. To accomplish this
result required high valuations. The theory of valua-
tion adopted by them was a means to this end.
Both sides, therefore, have been consistent in pur-
suing the main end, namely, economic advantage, and
have demonstrated the very human quality of giving
to themselves little worry because they have changed
fronts to attain the desired end.
Modern living conditions have made the cost of
gas, electricity, water and transportation matters which
touch and vitally concern the entire public. Valuation
of utilities and railroads (a subject practically non-
existent to the lawyer and economist of half a cen-
tury ago) has become a subject for major consideration
in both fields. Since 1900 more than fifty cases in-
volving the valuation of a utility or a railroad have
reached the Supreme Court of the United States for
decision. The number of such cases decided by lower
Federal courts, state courts and commissions is legion.
Much has been written by students both of law and
economics on this subject. Much has been written
by the attorneys of actual litigants. It is unfortunate
that so many of these writers have been led into errors
as to what the Supreme Court has actually held to con-
stitute the true measure of value for rate making pur-
poses. The very bitterness of the controversy and the
earnestness with which litigants have in recent years
urged their theories as the only correct theories of
valuation have, it appears, led some to assume that the
question to be decided is the relative merits of original
cost (or some modification of that theory, such as
historical cost or prudent investment cost) and repro-
duction cost. Much learning has been expended in
arguing this question. From an examination of the
decided cases it would appear that in no case from
Smyth v. Ames to the O'Fallon case has a majority
of the Supreme Court even intimated that either of
28. Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19.
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these theories of valuation could be used as a sole
means of ascertaining value.
Again the desire for an easily applied rule of law
instead of a principle of law has led some who cor-
rectly understood the decisions of the Supreme Court
to criticize these decisions and to demand a simpler
and more easily applied rule than the principle an-
nounced in the case of Smyth v. Ames. While the
writer entertains some skepticism on the subject of
making simple, to the extent maintained by some of
these writers, the determination of so complicated a
question as the ascertainment of the value of a great
railroad .system, he nevertheless recognizes that con-
structive criticism is the beginning point of progress.
He believes that intelligent criticism of this character
has already brushed away some cobwebs, and has been
of assistance to the courts in approaching valuation
problems more intelligently. To illustrate, the criti-
cism of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in the dissent-
ing opinion in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Case24
of an unintelligent attempt to make some kind of a
composite hodge-podge out of the evidence on the va-
rious factors required to be given consideration in
Smyth v. Ames has, we believe, caused the courts to
re-examine the principle declared in that case. The
holge-podge application so criticized has been, we think,
somewhat reduced and the intelligent re-examination
has demonstrated that the decision does not require
a composite hodge-podge at all. The requirements
of that decision are that all competent evidence of
value be received and that each bit of such evidence
be given such consideration as under all the circum-
stances of the case under investigation is "just and
right." This is but the elemental rule as to receiving
and Weighing evidence in any litigation.
It may be under the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence in a particular case that the original cost
less depreciation is a fair measure of present fair
value. It may be, as the Supreme Court said in the
Indianapolis Waterworks Company Case,25 that under
certain conditions reproduction cost less depreciation
furnishes a fair measure of value. It may be under
the facts shown in one case a valuation for taxation
purposes is important evidence of value" and under
the facts shown in another case such valuation has prac-
tically no probative worth." In other words, Smyth
v. Ames does not require that a valuation be made by
ascertaining value by means of various formule, adding
these values together and dividing by the number of
component valuations in order to get an average which
is called fair value. Neither does it attempt to say
that the weight to be given to any one factor shall
in all cases be in any definite ratio to any other factor.
It recognizes that the weight which should be given
to any evidence in for reaching value varies as the
conditions vary. It requires the consideration of all
competent evidence but it requires the valuing tribunal
to give to each piece of evidence such consideration,
and only such consideration, as is "just and right"
under the facts in that case.
It must be noted, however, that the requirement
of Smyth v. Ames is not that evidence which under
the facts does have probative value may be considered
(given lip consideration) and ignored in fixing fair
value. It must be considered and given such weight
24. Missouri ex rel S W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Service Comm.,
262 U. S. 276, 43 S. Ct. 544, 31 A. L. R. 807.
25. McCardle v. Indpls Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 S. Ct. 144.
26. San Diego L. & T. Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, pp. 443-4.
27. Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, pp. 51-2.
as is "just and right" under the circumstances of that
case."
Such are the principles controlling valuation for
rate-making purposes which the Supreme Court has
declared over and over againf.
In the light of the economic advantages to be
gained in an -abnormal time of price inflation by the
respective parties to this controversy, if the Supreme
Court could be induced to accept one or the other of
these theories of valuation,-or even to decide that
the one or the other should be given dominant consid-
eration in determining value, it was inevitable that the
question should again be carried to the Supreme Court.
The principles of valuation adopted by the courts sat-
isfied the avarice of neither party. Each hoped for an
advantage by a restatement of the principle. Each hoped
to have the court adopt its formula as a rule for valua-
tion or at least as the dominant factor in determining
value. The mere fact that the question had, therefore,
been repeatedly decided did not deter. The stake was
too high.
In Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. v. Public Service Commission,2 9 just twenty-five
years after Smyth v. Ames, the Supreme Court was
again called upon to accept a species of original cost,
namely, prudent investment cost, as the sole measure
of value. In this case the demands of the public,
voiced not alone by the attorneys for the litigants, but
also by numerous students of economics and law, made
a greater impression upon the Supreme Court than a
similar argument of the attorneys of railway security
holders made in Smyth v. Ames. For the first time
in a valuation case the Supreme Court divided, Justice
Brandeis and Holmes dissenting from the majority
opinion.
The majority opinion amounts to a re-affirmation
of the principles of Smyth v. Ames. It goes no far-
ther in principle. Those who try to find in this opin-
ion a declaration of the reproduction cost theory, or
authority to the proposition that reproduction cost
must be given dominant consideration in fixing value,
do violence to the opinion of the court. What the
court did decide was that price levels at the time of
making the valuation had been wholly disregarded and
that this was error. The Court said:
"Obviously, the Commission undertook to value the prop-
erty without according any weight to the greatly enhanced
costs of material, labor, supplies, etc., over those prevailing in
1913, 1914 and 1916. As matter of common knowledge, these
increases were large. Competent witnesses estimated them
as 45 to 50 per centum. . .
In the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 454,
this was said:
"'The making of a just return for the use of the prop-
erty involves the recognition of its fair value if it be more
than its cost. The property is held in private ownership, and
it is that property, and not the original cost of it, of which
the owner may not be deprived without due process of law.' . .
"It is impossible to ascertain what will amount to a fair
return upon properties devoted to public service without giv-
ing consideration to the cost of labor, supplies, etc., at the time
the investigation is made. An honest and intelligent forecast
of probable future values made upon a view of all the relevant
circumstances, is essential. If the highly important element
of present costs is wholly disregarded such as forecast be-
comes imposible."'
The minority opinion frankly advocates the re-
pudiation of Smyth v. Ames and the substitution of
the "prudent investment cost" for "fair value" as a
28. 169 U. S. 466, p. 547.
29. Missouri ex rel S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Service Com-
mission, Supra.
30. 262 U. S. 276, pp. 287-8.
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"rate base." It also attempts to demonstrate that the
adoption of such "rate base"-the dissenting justices
show some distaste for the word "value"-would not
do violence to the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment. As a brief for the prudent investment theory,
the dissenting opinion is a masterpiece. The lawyer,
however, will not forget that it is a dissenting opinion.
Less than thirty days after this decision was
handed down, the decision in the Bluefield Water
Works Case" and the Georgia Railway & Power Case3 2
were handed down on the same day (June 11, 1923).
The Bluefield opinion was written by Justice Butler,
the Georgia Railway & Power opinion by Justice Bran-
deis. Justices Butler and Brandeis are both brilliant
lawyers, but two men more different in temperament
would be difficult to find. Justice Brandeis was fresh
from the field of battle with his colleagues in the
Southwestern Bell Telephone. Case, and though out-
voted, he was probably not convinced that his views
as expressed in the dissent in that case were erroneous.
What, therefore, is more natural than that Justice
Brandeis should say in deciding the Georgia Railway
& Power Case:
"The refusal of the Commission and of the lower court
to hold that, for rate-making purposes, the physical properties
of a utility must be valued at the replacement cost less de-
preciation was clearly correct.""
If he. got any satisfaction out of this expressed
repudiation of the reproduction cost theory as the sole
measure of value in exchange for the refusal of the
court to accept his prudent investment theory in the
Southwestern Bell Telephone Case, the majority of
the court did not begrudge him the satisfaction. This
statement as a proposition of law was entirely sound
and was in conformity with the opinion of the ma-
jority of the court. This was simply stating in other
words what the court had said in Smyth v. Ames and
in all of the cases following it on this subject. Indeed,
Justice Brandeis supports this proposition by citing and
quoting from the Minnesota Rate Cases," Smyth v.
Ames and Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co."
Let it be noted further that in this opinion the
court says:
'Here the Commission gave careful consideration to the
cost of reproduction; hut it refused to adopt reproduction cost
as the measure of value.""
And again:
"The lower court . . . gave careful consideration to re-
placement cost.""
Also:
"The question on which this Court divided in the South-
western Bell Telephone Case, supra, is not involved here."'
The somewhat satirical dissent of Justice McKenna
in this case has furnished an occasion to those who
have been zealous in trying to find inconsistencies in
the decisions of the Supreme Court upon which to
base an argument that upon similar facts the Court
reached opposite conclusions in the Georgia Railway
& Power Case and in the Bluefield Case. The ma-
jority of the court, however, saw sufficient differences
in the facts to reach the conclusion that in the former
case the "Commission gave careful consideration to the
cost of reproduction," while in the latter case the
31. Bluefield Water Works Etc. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262
U. S. 679, 43 S. Ct. 675.
32. Georgia Ry. & P. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 262 U. S. 625,
43 S. Ct. 680.
2s. 262 U. S. 625, p. 630.
34. 262 U. S. 625, p. 630.
35. 262 U. S. 625, p. 631.
36. 262 U. S. 625, pp. 629-30.
37. 262 U. S. 625, p. 630.
38. 262 U. S. 625, p. 631.
Commission "did not accord proper, if any, weight
to the greatly enhanced costs of construction in 1920
over those prevailing about 1915 and before the war,
as established by uncontradicted evidence; and the
Company's detailed estimate cost of reproduction new,
less depreciation, at 1920 prices, appears to have been
wholly disregarded. This was erroneous." 9
The opinion of the state court in the Bluefield
Case 0 shows clearly that in making the valuation in
question, both the Commission and the West Virginia
court accepted the original cost as qualified by the
prudent investment idea as the measure of value. The
court, after calling attention to the limitation of orig-
inal cost by considerations.of extravagant construction
costs, or purchase at exorbitant or inflated prices if
the history of the utility showed such facts, said:
"That original cost considered in connection with the his-
tory and growth of the utility and the value of the services
rendered constitute the principal elements to be considered in
connection with rate-making, seems to be supported by nearly
all the authorities."'
It, therefore, appears in the Georgia Railway &
Power Case that the Commission made an honest effort
to arrive at value and gave (along with other evidence)
"careful consideration to the cost of reproduction" but
"refused to adopt reproduction cost as the measure
of value." This the Supreme Court approved.
In the Bluefield case the Commission and the State
Court adopted an historical original cost as the "prin-
cipal" element in determining value as their working
hypothesis. They gave lip service to fair value in the
following language:
"After maturely and carefully considering the various
methods presented for the ascertainment of fair value and giv-
ing such weight as seems proper to every element involved and
all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record."'
However, the fact that they gave consideration
to present construction costs only for the purpose of
rejecting them, appears from the Commission's report.
They said:
"It, therefore, seems that when a plant is developed under
these conditions (has kept accurate books) the net invest-
ment which of course means the total gross investment less
depreciation is the very best basis of valuation for rate-
making purposes and that the only other methods above re-
ferred to should be used only when it is impossible to arrive
at the true investment."-
Neither the Commission nor the State Court gave
proper, if any, weight to the greatly increased costs
of construction of the valuation period and wholly
disregarded the utilities' estimates of the cost of repro-
duction new, less depreciations. This, the court held,
was error.4 4  The Georgia Railway & Power Case
rejects reproduction cost as the "measure of value"
but recognizes its consideration as evidence of value.
The Bluefield case rejects the original historical cost
as constituting the sole or "principal" element of value
and requires a "proper" consideration of reproduction
cost as evidence of value.45 Moreover, the Court in
the Bluefield Case required more than a consideration
of reproduction cost for the purpose of rejecting it
because it conflicted with the theory of valuation used
by the Commission and the State Court. "Proper"
consideration of "greatly enhanced costs of construc-
tion" was required, namely, such consideration as is
just and right to both the Public and the Utility un-
39. 262 U. S. 679, p. 689.
40. Bluefield Waterworks etc. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. 89 W. Va.
736; 110 S. E. 205.
41. 110 S. E. 201, p. 207.
42. 262 U. S. 679, pp. 686-9.
48. 262 U. S. 679, pp. 687-6.
44. 262 U. S. 679, p. 689.
45. 262 U. S, 679, pp. 689-90.
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der all the facts in the case; a judgment factor to be
sure, but a judgment fairly arrived at in the light of
the facts. The court required a finding of present value
not a finding of cost, less depreciation.
Such are the inconsistencies between the Georgia
Railway Power Case and the Bluefield Case so much
cultivated by interested advocates of particular theories
of valuation.
The question remains, did the majority of the
Supreme Court give its approval to reproduction cost
less depreciation as either the sole, or as the dominant
factor in determining value in the Indianapolis Water
Co. Case.4 6 Many utility attorneys' have asserted this
thesis in their efforts to induce commissions and other
courts to apply reproduction cost less depreciation in
the case then under consideration. Many writers who
have been unwilling to accept the theory of Smyth v.
Ames have been diligent in seeking for conflicts in the
decisions of the Supreme Court as a ground work for
their thesis that the question of a proper theory of
valuation is still an open one. These writers have been
quite willing, though actuated by different purposes,
to go along with the utility attorneys in asserting that
in this case the Supreme Court either (1) went over
to the reproduction cost theory or (2) in substance
accepted this theory by requiring that reproduction cost
be accorded dominant consideration in arriving at value.
That the District Court was of the opinion repro-
duction cost should be accorded "dominating consid-
eration" seems certain. Both the majority opinion " and
the dissenting opinion 8 call attention to this fact. That
the value of not less than $19,000,000 fixed by the
District Court was materially less than reproduction
cost less depreciation, plus value of water rights, work-
ing capital and going concern value as shown by un-
contradicted evidence is equally certain.4 9
That the majority of the Court approved the val-
uation of $19,000,000, not because they approved the
reasoning of the District Judge, but because the facts
proved enabled the Supreme Court to say that the
value of the property as of January 1, 1924 (the val-
uation date) was not less than $19,000,000 is likewise
clear."
The Commission in fixing a value on the water
company's property adopted the estimate of the cost of
reproduction less depreciation of its own engineer on
the basis of the average prices of labor and material
for the ten-year period ending with 1921. The two
years immediately preceding the valuation date were
eliminated from this calculation. With reference to
this valuation, the Commission itself said:
"There is no doubt that the element of original cost has
been recognized sufficiently. There is doubt as to whether or
not the element of cost of reproduction new today has been
given sufficient weight.""
The Court's statement of the controlling prin-
ciples for the determination of value is in the fol-
lowing words:
"It is well established that values of utility properties
fluctuate, and that owners must bear the decline and are en-
titled to the increase. The decision of this Court in Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 547, declares that to ascertain value
'the present as compared with the original cost of construc-
tion' are, among other things, matters for consideration. But
this does not mean that the original cost or the present cost
46. Mecardle v. Indps. Water Co. 272 U. S. 400, 47 S. Ct. 144.
47. 272 U. S. 400, p. 418.
48. 272 U. S. 400, pp. 421-2 and note 1.
49. 272 U. S. 400, pp. 418-19.
50. 272 U. S. 400, pp. 420-21.
51. Commission's report as quoted 272 U. S. 400, p. 410.
or some figure arbitrarily chosen between these two is to be
taken as the measure. The weight to be given to such cost
figures and other items or classes of evidence is to be deter-
mined in the light of the facts of the case in hand.""
Thus, it is seen the court in the Indianapolis Water
Case reaffirmed Smyth v. Ames and specifically ac-
cepted the authority of that case as controlling. The
court reiterated what it had so often said before-that
fair value (1) does not mean the original cost, or (2)
the present cost, or (3) some figure arbitrarily chosen
between these two to be taken as the measure." The
court declared again:
"The weight to be given to such cost figures and other
items or daises of evidence is to be determined in the light of
the facts of the case in hand."
The court goes on to illustrate under what condi
tions original cost constitutes a fair measure of value,
and under what conditions present cost constitutes a
fair measure of value of physical equipment. The
court said:
"Undoubtedly, the reasonable cost of a system of water-
works, well-planned and efficient for the public service, isgood evidence of its value at the time of construction. And
such actual cost will continue fairly well to measure the
amount to be attributed to the physical elements of the property
so long as there is no change in the level of applicable prices.And, as indicated by the report of the Commission, it is true
that, if the tendency, or trend of prices is not definitely up-
ward or downward and it does not appear probable that there
will be a substantial change of prices, then the present value
of lands plus the present cost of constructing the plan, lessdepreciation, if any, is a fair measure of the value of thephysical elements of the property.""
In any event, the task before the Commission and
the courts was to ascertain the "property value" as of
the valuation date, not its original cost nor the cost of
reproducing it.
The court approved a valuation of not less than$19,000,000, not because the evidence showed that sum
to be the cost of "spot" reproduction, but because the
court found "on a consideration of the evidence . . .
the value of the property as of January 1, 1924 (the
valuation date) and immediately following was not less
than $19,000,000." 64
The dissent of Justices Brandeis and Stone in this
case is not at variance with the majority opinion that
neither original cost nor the present cost nor some
"figure arbitrarily chosen between these two is to be
Laken as the measure" of value. Smyth v. Ames is
cited in the dissent as a controlling authority. The
erroneous conception of the lower court as to giving
"dominating consideration" to evidence of "spot" re-
production, as heretofore mentioned, is severely criti-
cized. But the real dissent is that the case should have
been reversed and remanded for a new trial instead of
the Supreme Court's examining the evidence and enter-
ing such judgment as to that court seemed right. The
dissenting justices recognized the right of the Supreme
Court to take the course of action which it did take,
but differed from the majority as to the expediency of
doing so. The substance of the dissent is found in
this language:
"The evidence introduced before the trial court, which
seems to be in substance the same as that introduced before
the Commission, is now before this Court. We have power to
examine the evidence and to enter such decree as may be
appropriate. Compare Denver v. Denver Union Water Co.,
246 U. S. 178. But the better practice requires that the casebe remanded to the District Court, so that the evidence may
be re-examined there in the light of the applicable rules (au-
52. 272 U. S. 400, p. 410.
53. 272 U. S. 400, p. 411.
54. 272 U. S. 400, p. 421.
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thorities cited). To this end the decree should, in my opinion,
be reversed.""
Had the principles controlling a proper valuation
for rate-making purposes been an ordinary legal ques-
tion, the repeated pronouncements of the Supreme
Court would have beert accepted as final by the pro-
fession long ago. But valuation of railways and util-
ities is not an ordinary question. The vast sums in-
volved, alone, remove it from that category. The
stakes are so tremendous that long chances are not to
be unexpected. Furthermore, the parties in interest
to such a controversy are not ordinary litigants. On
the one side the public is the party in interest. On the
other side, every railr'oad and every utility within the
jurisdiction of the hearing tribunal is interested in the
outcome. Such parties in interest in such a controversy
are not easily deterred from trying once more in the
hope of a somewhat more favorable decision the next
time.
The Interstate Commerce Commission came to its
herculean task of valuing the railroads of the country
at a time of rapidly mounting prices. The railroads in
these hearings strove to have reproduction costs given
dominant consideration in determining value. The rep-
resentatives of the public strove for the adoption of
an historic or prudent investment cost. Both sides
seemed to be blissfully innocent of the fact that the
Supreme Court had in definite and certain terms re-
pudiated the contentions of both. Both sides cited and
quoted Supreme Court decisions to support theories
that the cases cited repudiated in positive terms. Both
entered the realm of abstract economics and tortured
economic or pseudo-economic theories into ponderous
and voluminous arguments in support of their respec-
tive views. The result was confusion. The controlling
principles of law were lost sight, of.
Unfortunately, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion found placed upon its shoulders the main burden
of representing the interests of the public in this con-
troversy. It likewise was required to sit as a tribunal
for the determination of value. The Commission as
an advocate espoused the cause of prudent investment
cost and the Commission as a tribunal was convinced
by its own argument as an advocate.
The O'Fallon Case" brought to the Supreme
Court the Commission's theory of railway valuation
for approval or disapproval.
The theory of valuation adopted by the Commis-
sion was substantially this: (1) All man-made prop-
erty which was in existence June 30, 1914, was valued
on the basis of cost of reconstruction at 1914 prices,
less depreciation to valuation date. This basis was
used as a means of arriving at a fair substitute for
original cost as to this property, the facts as to actual
cost not being available. (2) Like property installed
between June 30, 1914, and June 30, 1919, was valued
on the basis of 1914 construction costs less deprecia-
tion and there was added a sum representing price in-
creases for that period-again a substitute for original
cost. (3) Like property acquired between June 30,
1919, and valuation date was put in at original cost
less depreciation. (4) Land was valued as of the val-
uation date.57  Thus, it will be seen that the Commis-
sion adopted as to all man-made elements of the rail-
way, the nearest possible approach to original cost as
the sole factor in determining value. Satisfactory evi-
5i. 272 U. S. 400, pp. 424-5.
56. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. U. S. et al, 279 U. S. 461, 49
S. Ct. 384.
57. 124 I. C. C. 37; 49 S. Ct. 384, p. 388.
dence of actual original costs was not available and
the Commission adopted the above method of finding
a figure which substantially represented original cost,
less depreciation to valuation date of these items.
A large portion of the opinion of the Commission
is devoted to a brief in support of the prudent invest-
ment theory of valuation for rate-making purposes as
superior to the reproduction theory.
The theory of valuation contended for by the Com-
mission is clearly at variance with the law as declared
by the Supreme Court. The majority of the Court
is clearly borne out by the fact in holding that repro-
duction costs of the man-made property of the rail-
way as of the valuation date, were not given any con-
sideration by the Commission in fixing its value.
To students of valuation who were neither advo-
cates of interested parties nor devotees of an economic
theory which they felt it their duty to further, the
outcome of the O'Fallon Case was never in serious
doubt. The majority opinion asserts no new principle
of law. It simply reasserts that original cost, or some
synthetic substitute for original cost, is not the sole
measure of value. That construction costs at the date
of the valuation must not be ignored. The majority
of the court find, as to all man-made items of the
O'Fallon property, the Commission refused to give
consideration to current reproduction costs; that the
question presented for decision was not how much
weight should be given to current reproduction costs
but whether or not such costs must be given consider-
ation at all. The following from the majority opinion
is the kernel of the opinion:
"The question on which the Commission divided is this:
When seeking to ascertain the value of railroad property for
recapture purposes, must it give consideration to current, or
reproduction, costs? The weight to be accorded thereto is
not the matter before us. No doubt there are some, perhaps
many, railroads the ultimate value of which should be placed
far below the sum necessary for reproduction. But Congress
has directed that values shall be fixed upon a consideration of
present costs along with all other pertinent facts; and this
mandate must be obeyed."'
The minority opinion of Justice Brandeis, in which
Justices Holmes and Stone concurred, demonstrates
with great clearness that Justices Brandeis, Holmes and
Stone are not in sympathy with the principles of val-
uation adopted by a majority of the court. It is a
masterful restatement of the arguments of the prudent
investment theory. However, it must not be overlooked
that, while still unconvinced of the wisdom of the
majority, the minority do recognize the authority of
the principle that value for rate-making purposes is
present actual value; that current reconstruction cost
is evidence to be considered in ascertaining present
value; and that the Commission may not arbitrarily
disregard the probative effect of evidence. The dis-
senting opinion says:
"The Commission undertook, as will be shown, to find
present actual value, and, in so doing, both to follow the direc-
tion of Congress and to apply the rule declared in the South-
western Bell Case.""
And again, the dissenting opinion says:
"An arbitrary disregard by the Commission of the proba-
tive effect of evidence would, of course, be ground for setting
aside an order, as this would be an abuse of discretion.""
This dissent further states:
"The fundamental question in the Southwestern Bell Case
was one of substantive constitutional law, namely: Is the rate
base on which the Constitution guarantees to a public utility
58. 49 S. Ct. 384, p. 388.
59. 49 S. Ct. 384, p. 390.
60. 49 S. Ct. 384, p. 390.
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the rig'ht to earn a fair return the actual value of the prop-
erty at the time of the rate hearing, or is it the cost or capital
prudently invested in the enterprise? The court decided that
the rate base is the actual value at the time of the rate hear-
ing. That proposition of substantive law the Commission un-
dertook to apply to the facts presented in the case at bar.
Recognizing that evidence of increased reconstruction costs is
admissible for the purpose of showing an actual value greater
than the original cost or the prudent investment, it found in
respect to some of the carrier's property that the evidence of
enhanced reconstruction cost was persuasive of higher present
value. As to the rest of the property, it held that the evi-
dence was neither adequate nor persuasive.
"Of both railroads and the local utility it is true, undei
the rule of substantive law adopted in the Southwestern Bell
Case, that value is the sum on which a fair return. can be
earned consistently with the laws of trade and legal enact-
ments."'
Thus, it is seen that this minority opinion does not
dissent from "the rule of substantive law adopted in
the Southwestern Bell Case, that value" and neither
current reproduction cost nor prudent investment cost
is the legal rate base.
The court divided on the question as to whether
or not the Commission did in fact give proper con-
sideration to current reproduction costs in making its
valuation, not on the controlling principles of sub-
stantive law.
The minority, while admitting that the Commis-
sion declined to give weight to the evidence introduced
to show current reproduction costs greater than those
of 1914, as to structural property and equipment ac-
quired prior to June 30, 1914,62 were of the opinion
that the Commission gave sufficient consideration to
the requirements of the substantive law by valuing land
at current prices and by giving to additions and bet-
terments made after June 30, 1914, "a value approxi-
mating their cost less physical depreciation."" The
minority seem in their zeal to support the Commission
to overlook that there was no difference in the theory
of valuing all structural property and equipment ac-
quired before June 30, 1914, and such property ac-
quired after that date. The Commission adopted the
same theory as to both, namely: prudent investment.
They used actual costs after June 30, 1919, as the
books were available. They used 1914 cost estimates
equated to the estimated time of construction basis for
additions between June 30, 1914, and June 30, 1919.
They used 1914 estimates unequated for structures and
equipment made and acquired before June 30, 1914,
because: "The Commission had before it 'the cost of
reproduction new of the structural portion of this prop-
erty estimated on the basis of our 1914 unit prices,
coupled with the knowledge that costs of reproduction
so arrived at were not greatly different from the orig-
inal costs'."" The only property in the valuation of
which the Commission gave weight to current prices
was naked- land value.
This clearly was not a compliance with the re-
quirements of the statute which required "due con-
sideration to all the elements of value recognized by
the law of the land for rate-making purposes.""
The minority opinion is patently a brief in support
of an economic theory which the majority of the court
had theretofore refused to accept as law. It, in effect,
admits that its theory has been rejected by the court
as in violation of the Federal Construction. But, it
seeks to trade a lip service to the admitted, established,
substantive law for the practical adoption of its re-
jected theory.
61. 49 S. Ct. 384, p. 405.
62. 49 S. Ct. 384, p. 407.
63. 49 S. Ct. 384, p. 407.
64. 49 S. Ct. 384, p. 407.
65. Sub. 4 Sec. 15a Transportation Act, 49 U. S. C. A., pp. 443-4.
Were the dissent in this case less ably stated, or
were it not sponsored by three very able jurists for
whose learning and high-mindedness the profession en-
tertains the greatest respect, the inconsistency between
the principles of law admitted therein and the result
sought to be reached would be obvious. The recogni-
tion of the principle that an arbitrary disregard of the
probative effect of evidence by the Commission is
ground for reversal of the Commission's order; that
the Southwestern Bell Telephone Case and the Indian-
apolis Water Case contain a binding statement of the
substantive law in respect to valuation; coupled'with
an earnest argument that the Commission, under the
economic conditions prevailing in 1920, 1921, 1922
and 1923 as disclosed by the evidence in this case,
could comply with the law by receiving evidence of
current reconstruction cost for the sole purpose of re-
jecting it without giving any weight to it, as to all the
structural property and equipment of a railroad, re-
quires great courage.
We venture the suggestion that those of the pro-
fession who approach this decision with open minds
rather than as advocates either of an interested litigant
or of a preconceived economic theory will have little
difficulty in agreeing that the majority opinion is
soundly reasoned.
Through economic depression, normal times, and
economic inflation, the Supreme Court has steered a
straight course, uncontrolled by the clamor of contend-
ing parties seeking for temporary advantage. It has
adhered to the view that railroads and utilities were pri-
vate enterprises engaged in services for the public.
That the rights of both the owners and the public, as
declared by law, must be protected. That the protec-
tion which the owners are entitled to is a fair return on
the fair value of their property devoted to the public
use. That fair value for rate-making purposes must
be ascertained as of the time under investigation. That
fair value is synonymous with neither original cost nor
the current cost of reproduction. It is maintained that
both original cost and present cost of reproduction are
competent evidence of value to be considered along with
all other competent evidence. That each bit of evi-
dence, whether original cost, reproduction cost or other
competent evidence, must, in determining value, re-
ceive such consideration as under the circumstances of
the case is right and proper in arriving at a true fair
value. That any evidence in determining value
must be given due consideration in the light of the
circumstances of the case under investigation and
that an arbitrary disregard of evidence having pro-
bative value is error.
The Supreme Court has not prescribed any for-
mula for ascertaining fair value nor attempted to con-
trol the exercise of a proper judgment on the part of
the trying tribunal. It has, however, insisted that the
trying tribunal ascertain fair value as of the time un-
der investigation. It has insisted that all competent
evidence offered be received and that evidence having
probative value be not arbitrarily ignored.
In this fruitful field of litigation, the Supreme
Court has been singularly consistent for more than
thirty years in adhering to these controlling principles
of valuation. Litigants have not hesitated to exchange
valuation theories to conform to economic advantage.
It will be interesting to watch the effect of the next
economic depression on both the theories of the present
advocate of reproduction cost and those of the present
advocates of prudent investment cost.
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